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At the end of 1994, filtration points began to function in the cities of
Mozdok (Northern Osetia Republic), Stavropol, Pyatigorsk (Stavropol region)
and later in Grozny. These points were established as a place where those
who were suspected of participation in the fighting against Russian forces
or of having committed a criminal act on the territory of Chechnya could
be brought. However, during the first six months of the war, there were
not any normative documents which clarified the status of or regulated
the activities of such filtration points.
The arbitrary nature of the detention lead to the imprisonment of an overwhelming
majority of individual citizens who had not taken part in the fighting.1
Some of the citizens detained at the filtration points were used as hostages
by the federal services of the RF. As a result, the Chechen side was, in
many instances, offered people who had not participated in the fighting
and who were not officials of the self-proclaimed CRI in exchange for Russian
soldiers.
For example, according to the numerous reports in the official Russian
media, Djokhar Dudaev’s older brother, Bekmuza Dudaev, was detained on
February 19, 1995 and brought to the Lefortovo prison in Moscow. No proof
of his participation in the fighting was ever found nor was he declared
to be an official of the CRI. It was simply announced that «he had a big
influence on his brother».2 On April 6, 1996, it was announced that B.
Dudaev was exchanged for Vyacheslav Dmitrenchenko, a major of the 22nd
special assignment brigade of the CAI who had been taken prisoner on January
7th. In addition to B. Dudaev a large group of those detained at the filtration
point were also offered. Before their release, however, they were required
to sign a document stating that they had no claims against the management
of the filtration point. Included in this group was Takhir Davletykaev,
the general prosecutor of the Shelkovsky region, who refused to be exchanged
and demanded that he be charged of a crime in accordance with the law.
Despite his insistence, he was exchanged with the rest of the members of
the group.
According to information from Isa Madaev,3 a representative of the leadership
of the armed forces of the CRI who conducted the exchange from the Chechen
side, the discussion was not about Dudaev’s older brother, but rather about
his younger brother, Makharbi, who had worked in Grozny as a taxi driver.
Furthermore, the Chechen side insisted that he be excluded from the list
of those who were to be released in that particular exchange.4 According
to Madaev, this was done because Djokhar Dudaev had ordered the execution
of the officer who the Russian side had been trying to exchange for his
brother Makharbi.
***
Those detained were used as hostages as well as for other reasons.
In January 1996, Madaev was detained in a Grozny filtration point. His
relatives, who approached the MIA RF in March regarding the possibilities
of his release, were told that Mataev could be freed in exchange for a
captured Russian soldier, but that they would have to find one themselves.
The women responded that they had neither the resources nor the connections
necessary to find and pay off the ransom of a captured Russian soldier.
As another solution, officials of the MIA RF suggested that they find,
dig up and bring in the bodies of three officers from a specific detachment
of the MIA who had been killed in the course of the fighting in Grozny
between March 6-8, 1996. They were also told where the bodies were buried.
Earlier attempts by the Russian side to remove the bodies had been impeded
by shooting in the nearby area. The women brought the bodies of two officers
and the burned remains of a third to the Russians, and toward the end of
March, Madaev was released.5
According to the story of Madina Magomadova,6 officials of the MIA RF promised
to release her brother, Shamsa Magomadov if she found out and provided
them with information about the whereabouts of a certain captured Russian
soldier. When she met those conditions, she was told that that soldier
was not needed and that she should find out the whereabouts of a certain
captured officer. When she presented that information, the demands again
changed. To this day, her brother has not been released and no information
about his whereabouts is known.
According to materials of the Russian power structures which were made
available after the taking of Grozny by Chechen forces in August 1996,
there was a document prepared by officials of the FSS on July 29, 1995
«On the Whereabouts of Russian Soldiers Taken Prisoner by Illegal Military
Formations». This document contains sentences similar to the following
one: «On July 25, in an encounter with citizens who were interested in
exchanging their own men for captured Russian soldiers, it became clear
that they had recently been looking for such soldiers who could be used
in an exchange.» What follows is an account of the information which these
civilians obtained in the course of their searches.
***
We have mentioned only those instances where criminal activities (blackmail or trading people) have taken place «in the name of the State». The examples are not about the release of prisoners for money, i.e. the private criminal activities of soldiers and officials of the MIA RF.
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